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Abstract 
This article traces the trajectory of party Euroscepticism in Greece drawing upon 
theories of issue competition. It demonstrates that the economic dimension of the 
multiple crises facing the EU contributed to a Eurosceptic shift in public opinion; the 
electoral success of Eurosceptic parties; new parties populating the Europhile end of 
the spectrum; and the formation of a coalition government united not by ideological 
affinity but by a common Eurosceptic and anti-austerity agenda. Mainstream parties 
maintained their pro-EU agendas and challenger parties offered both pro- and anti-EU 
policy options to the electorate. The prospect of power resulted in the progressive 
softening of Euroscepticism among challenger parties. EU issue salience was 
relatively high across the party system and remained so during the crisis. Although 
Greek parties justified their pro- and anti-EU attitudes using a number of frames, 
economic arguments were prevalent at the height of the crisis, and challenger parties 
of the left intensified their claims of the EU interfering in national politics. The 
findings have implications for our understanding of the evolving nature of 
Euroscepticism and the ways in which it may feature in domestic party politics.  
 
Keywords: Euroscepticism, Greece, crisis, position, salience, framing, party 
competition 
 
Introduction  
 
Greece has been at the forefront of EuropeÕs multiple crises. The country was one of 
the leading protagonists in the Eurozone crisis, often described in the media as the 
Ôsick man of EuropeÕ. GreeceÕs financial crisis not only put the future of the euro 
currency in question, but also the countryÕs membership of the monetary union. The 
country was also one of the frontline states during the refugee crisis due to its 
proximity to sender regions, such as the Middle East and North Africa. It was 
criticised for failing to provide adequate reception facilities despite receiving funding 
from the European Union (EU) for this purpose (Guild et al., 2015). The United 
KingdomÕs (UK) 2016 referendum in favour of Brexit served to revive discussions 
about the possibility of a spill-over effect on GreeceÕs Eurozone and/or EU 
membership.   
 
Against this background, this article aims to study the ways in which the multiple 
crises facing the EU have impacted upon party-based Euroscepticism in Greece 
through an analysis of party competition over European integration, including EU 
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issue position, EU issue salience and EU issue framing. In doing so, this article 
differentiates between mainstream, i.e. centre-left and centre-right parties that 
routinely alternate in government; and challenger parties, i.e. far right and far left 
actors that do not ordinarily participate in government (van de Wardt et al., 2014). 
Classifying parties with reference to a framework that differentiates between populist 
and non-populist political actors on the basis of MuddeÕs (2004: 543) definition of 
populism as an ideology that views society separated into two antagonistic groups, i.e. 
the pure people versus the corrupt elite, is less helpful in the case of Greece. This is 
because research has shown that Greece is a populist democracy, with populism 
observed across the party system rather than by specific actors (Pappas, 2013; 
Vasilopoulou et al., 2014).
1
 
 
Drawing upon theories of party competition and Euroscepticism (De Vries and 
Hobolt, 2012; Helbling et al., 2010; Sitter, 2001; Taggart, 1998; van de Wardt et al., 
2014;	 Vasilopoulou, 2018; Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015), the article 
hypothesizes that in times of crisis (1) mainstream parties will maintain their positive 
EU position, but are likely to increase EU issue salience; (2) challenger parties will 
emphasize their extreme positions on the EU, but the prospect of government 
participation is likely to result in them softening their Eurosceptic agenda; and (3) 
frames related to the specific nature of the crisis are likely to predominate across the 
party system. Challenger parties are also likely to further criticise the EU for 
interfering in member statesÕ domestic affairs.  
 
Findings suggest that EuropeÕs multiple crises coincided with high levels of political 
polarisation over the question of Europe. Both pro- and anti-EU parties entered the 
system, offering the electorate a number of different options on the question of 
Europe. A coalition government was formed on the basis of its common Eurosceptic, 
anti-establishment, and anti-austerity agenda. Support for the mainstream pro-EU 
New Democracy declined whereas the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) Ða 
previously minor challenger party- effectively replaced the mainstream pro-EU 
PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) as the main left-wing contender for 
power.  
 
The Greek case confirmed assumptions suggesting that mainstream parties would 
maintain their pro-EU agendas. However, contrary to expectations, not all challenger 
parties put forward Eurosceptic positions. Challenger parties offered both pro- and 
anti-EU policy options to the electorate. SYRIZAÕs progressive softening of its 
Euroscepticism once it became one of the main contenders for power also supports 
the theoretical assumptions. EU issue salience was relatively high across the party 
system and remained so during the crisis. Finally, although Greek parties justified 
their pro- and anti-EU attitudes using a number of frames, economic arguments were 
prevalent at the height of the crisis, and challenger parties Ðparticularly of the leftÐ 
intensified their claims of the EU interfering in national politics.  
	
The article commences with a short historical discussion of Greek Euroscepticism. It 
further unpacks the nature of multiple crises in the Greek context. It continues by 
outlining the theoretical framework with reference to EU issue competition, including 
issue position, issue salience and issue framing. It subsequently tests the theoretical 
propositions through the use of expert survey data and the analysis of party 
manifestos.    
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The background of Greek Euroscepticism  
 
Greece became the 10
th
 member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
January 1981. The countryÕs relationship with the EEC had began in 1959 when the 
government submitted its application for accession, leading to the 1961 Athens 
Association Agreement, which came into force in 1962. The agreement included the 
establishment of a customs union and the harmonisation of certain economic policies, 
notably agriculture. The process was interrupted as a result of the April 1967 military 
coup and was re-activated after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974. The Prime 
Minister and leader of the Conservative New Democracy, Costantinos Karamanlis, 
submitted a formal application for the country to join the EEC on 12 June 1975. New 
Democracy associated EEC membership with economic modernisation, external 
security in relation to Communism and Turkey, stability, and democratisation 
(Karamouzi, 2015).  
 
With the exception of the Centre Union, which supported New DemocracyÕs policy, 
KaramanlisÕ choice to lodge an application for EEC membership was, however, met 
with domestic opposition. The Greek Communist Party (KKE) called for the 
countryÕs withdrawal from the Association Agreement. Yet, its fringe party status in 
the Greek parliament entailed that its influence was relatively minor. PASOKÕs 
opposition to EEC membership, on the other hand, was much more politically 
relevant. The party, which was established in 1974 and was on a path to power by the 
end of that decade, viewed the EEC as a construction serving imperialist and capitalist 
interests detrimental to national sovereignty. Its leader, Andreas Papandreou, 
advocated instead a Ônational road to SocialismÕ and Ôself-generating developmentÕ 
founded on import substitution with domestic production and the development of 
cooperation with Mediterranean and North African countries (Verney, 2011: 57). 
New DemocracyÕs slogan ÔGreece belongs to the WestÕ was juxtaposed with 
PapandreouÕs catch phrase ÔGreece belongs to the GreeksÕ (PASOK, 1977: 14-15). 
PASOK dichotomised politics and portrayed the EEC as part of an international plot 
of foreign intervention in Greek domestic affairs. PASOKÕs slogan ÔThe EEC and 
NATO form part of the same syndicateÕ (ΕΟΚ και ΝΑΤΟ το ίδιο συνδικάτο) is 
characteristic of this period, implying that foreign powers colluded to institutionalise 
GreeceÕs dependency status (Clogg, 1987: 138; PASOK, 1977). PASOKÕs 
Euroscepticism was justified on nationalist grounds, arguing that it was the only party 
to safeguard Greek national sovereignty with a Ôproud, independent and respectableÕ 
foreign policy. 
 
Despite party disagreement on GreeceÕs EEC accession, Karamanlis pushed through 
entry negotiations. The Greek Parliament ratified the Accession Treaty in 1979, but 
was boycotted by both PASOK and KKE. Karamanlis relinquished his position as the 
Prime Minister and was elected President of the Greek Republic in May 1980. 
PASOKÕs success in the 1981 national election meant that an overtly hard 
Eurosceptic party would form the new Greek government. However, the party could 
not fulfil its 1977 manifesto pledge for a referendum, as this was to be constitutionally 
initiated by the President of the Republic who was unwilling to do so (Verney, 2011: 
61). PASOK continued its confrontational strategy until the mid-1980s, framing its 
1984 EP election campaign as Ôthe final confrontationÕ in which the party articulated 
Ôthe voice of National Independence, the voice of the People, the voice of the NationÕ 
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(PASOK, 1984: 10 capitals in the original). Greeks were asked to select between Ôthe 
past and the future, between progress and regression, between dependence and 
national independence, between the Middle Ages of the Right and the regeneration of 
the LeftÕ (Kalyvas, 1997: 86-87).  
 
As PASOK remained in government during the 1980s and Greece secured European 
loans in light of an unsustainable independent Greek economic policy, however, 
PapandreouÕs strategy of Ônational exceptionalismÕ progressively subsided, and the 
party changed its rhetoric (Featherstone, 1994; Pagoulatos, 2004; Verney, 2011). 
Since PASOKÕs U-turn, Greek political parties and public opinion were largely pro-
European with no party posing a significant threat to the countryÕs European 
orientation (Verney, 2015). During the 1990s and 2000s Euroscepticism was only 
articulated by minor challenger parties confined to opposition, such as KKE, the 
Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN), the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the 
Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI). During that time, Greek public opinion was 
highly supportive of integration and the Euro-currency (Vasilopoulou, 2018). This 
suggests that Greeks would have likely supported their countryÕs membership of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), if a referendum had taken place at that time 
(Kokkinaki, 1998).  
 
The context of multiple crises in Greece   
 
The 2008 global financial crisis affected GreeceÕs economy by decreasing its financial 
liquidity and slowing down the real economy (Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009). It 
took place against a background of domestic fiscal vulnerability and weak institutions 
characterised by clientelism. GreeceÕs credit rating was downgraded and the country 
plunged into deep recession, accompanied by high levels of unemployment and a 
large deficit as a percentage of GDP. To avoid the prospect of insolvency, the country 
became the recipient of a series of bail-out packages, which were linked to 
programmes of strict budget compliance, structural reform and severe austerity cuts. 
The ÔtroikaÕ, i.e. the group of GreeceÕs lenders formed by the European Commission, 
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was 
established to monitor the implementation of the bail-out programmes, which 
involved strong external interference in Greek economic policy.  
 
These developments affected Greek citizensÕ view of European integration. The 
percentage of Greeks having a negative image about the EU sharply increased from 
2009 onwards, becoming much higher than the EU average (Figure 1). At the height 
of the crisis in 2013 approximately half of Greek respondents had a negative image of 
the EU as opposed to approximately 28 per cent of EU citizens. The EUÕs heavy 
involvement in debtor countriesÕ economic policy meant that EU-initiated reforms 
became linked with economic malaise and loss of sovereignty (Clements et al., 2014; 
Katsanidou and Otjes, 2016). In addition, the sovereign debt crisis coincided with 
Greece being one of the frontline states during the refugee crisis with thousands of 
arrivals being reported in the Greek islands of Chios, Kos, Lesvos and Samos. This 
resulted in the recurrent perception among the Greek population that the EU was not 
doing enough to help the country manage the crisis. In Autumn 2015, Greeks 
exhibited the highest levels of distrust in the EU at 81 per cent, that is 26 percentage 
points higher than the EU average (Eurobarometer, 2015).  
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 [Figure 1 about here] 
 
The context of multiple crises combined with the countryÕs inability to promptly 
resolve them contributed to the rise of Euroscepticism, high levels of electoral 
volatility, the electoral success of anti-establishment parties, and the fragmentation of 
the party system (Dinas and Rori, 2013; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2013). 
Greece held two consecutive electoral contests in May and June 2012 in the shadow 
of an imminent Grexit. Parties were divided between those that supported the terms of 
the bailout agreements that Greece had signed with the troika, i.e. the mainstream 
PASOK and New Democracy, and those that opposed them, i.e. the far left KKE and 
SYRIZA, the moderate Democratic Left (DIMAR), and the far right Golden Dawn 
and ANEL. The May election did not result in a single party gaining a majority in 
parliament for the first time in over two decades. This trend persisted in the 
subsequent June 2012 election, but New Democracy was able to create a coalition 
government with the support of PASOK and DIMAR.  
 
In December 2014 an indirect parliamentary election was held for the position of the 
President of the Greek Republic. According to the Constitution, the President is 
elected by a parliamentary supermajority of two thirds of MPs in the first two rounds, 
and 180 out of 300 MPs in the third round.
2
 Failure to elect a President paved the way 
to an early general election in January 2015, with SYRIZA topping the polls, but 
remaining short of two parliamentary seats from forming a single-party government. 
In an unprecedented move, SYRIZA formed a government coalition with ANEL. 
Although these parties sat at opposite ends of the left-right ideological spectrum, they 
both campaigned on a Eurosceptic agenda (to be discussed below) and criticised 
domestic ÔcorruptÕ elites, pledging to end austerity and defy GreeceÕs foreign lenders 
(Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016). These elections marked the failure of pro-
EU parties, which were not only associated with chronic clientelism and corruption; 
but were also linked to five yearsÕ implementation of austerity cuts (Rori, 2016). New 
DemocracyÕs support declined whereas PASOK was relegated to a peripheral status in 
the system.  
 
In late June 2015, the SYRIZA-ANEL government initiated a referendum on whether 
the country would accept the proposals of GreeceÕs lenders. The government together 
with the far right Golden Dawn openly sided with the ÔNoÕ camp, whereas the pro-EU 
New Democracy, PASOK, and the newly formed centrist The River supported the 
ÔYesÕ camp. The far left KKE boycotted the referendum, arguing that it represented a 
false dilemma, and that both the Greek government and the EU intended to put 
forward anti-popular austerity measures (Tsatsanis and Teperoglou, 2016). Despite 
the fact that Greek citizens rejected the bailout conditions on 5 July 2015 with a 
majority of 61 per cent, a few weeks later the government signed a provisional bailout 
deal, which revealed SYRIZAÕs decision to keep Greece in the Eurozone. Some 
SYRIZA MPs, however, revolted against their party, which meant that it had lost its 
parliamentary majority. In August 2015, SYRIZAÕs leader resigned and another snap 
election was held in September of the same year, which resulted in the formation of a 
second SYRIZA-ANEL coalition.  
 
European crises, Euroscepticism and party competition  
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The above discussion pointed towards a number of ways in which Greek party politics 
changed as a result of the European crises. The public became more Eurosceptic, a 
coalition government was formed on the basis of its common Eurosceptic and anti-
system agenda, and the mainstream pro-EU parties were faced with substantive 
electoral losses. How may we theorise the impact of European crises on Greek party- 
based Euroscepticism? Theories of party competition expect parties to compete on 
three key dimensions: issue conflict, issue salience and issue framing. Positional 
theories view competition as based on conflict over policy choices (e.g. Downs, 
1957). Parties take different policy positions in order to signal their programmatic 
differences to the electorate. Salience theories perceive competition less as a conflict 
over different policy positions, and examine instead issue emphasis (e.g. Budge, 
2015). Issue framing refers instead to the ways in which parties tend to problematize a 
policy issue and justify their positions (Entman, 1993). 
 
The question of Europe has been described as a Ôwedge issueÕ, crosscutting the 
traditional left-right dimension of conflict (van de Wardt et al., 2014). Related to EU 
issue conflict and salience, the literature differentiates between on the one hand the 
responses of mainstream parties, i.e. those that routinely alternate in government; and 
non-mainstream/challenger political actors, i.e. those that do not ordinarily participate 
in government (e.g. De Vries and Hobolt, 2012; van de Wardt et al., 2014). 
Mainstream parties tend to primarily compete on the left-right dimension, and as such 
they have few incentives to compete on the newer EU dimension in order to eschew 
potential reputational costs (Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015; see also Hooghe et 
al., 2002). This entails that, despite the fact that they tend to be pro-EU; they are 
motivated to avoid debating questions that relate to European integration. This leaves 
a void for challenger parties to become EU issue entrepreneurs. They challenge the 
status quo by emphasising extreme positions on Europe (e.g. De Vries and Hobolt, 
2012; Wagner, 2012; see also Adams et al., 2006). Challenger parties seek to 
differentiate themselves by strategically increasing the salience of the question of 
Europe, thus intensifying conflict over the EU issue. In the face of rising popular 
Euroscepticism, this strategy is expected to lead to an electoral advantage over their 
mainstream pro-EU competitors (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Vasilopoulou, 2018; 
Whitefield and Rohrschneider, 2015).  
 
These expectations are also in line with research on Euroscepticism, which 
conceptualises opposition to the EU as a Ôtouchstone of domestic dissentÕ and 
suggests that it is primarily observed among protest-based and single-issue parties, 
which are peripheral to the system (Taggart, 1998). When faced with the prospect of 
government participation, parties are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism 
(Sitter, 2001). This implies that the ways in which parties compete on the question of 
Europe is not fixed. They change subject to electoral, party political and government 
constraints (Vasilopoulou, 2018).  
 
In times of crisis, challenger parties may see additional electoral opportunities arising 
from political and economic instability. This may motivate them to continue to stress 
their Eurosceptic positions. At the same time, the prospect of government may 
incentivise them to soften their Euroscepticism. Mainstream parties are likely to Ôstick 
to their gunsÕ and continue with their existing strategies in order to maintain their 
competitive position. That being said, it is plausible that the increased importance of 
European integration in the public debate combined with stronger pressures from 
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challenger parties may compel them to alter their tactics and increase the salience of 
the EU issue in their agenda. However, it is unlikely that mainstream parties will 
engage in wholehearted positional change on the EU issue, as this will undermine 
their prior policy record and reputation.  
 
Related to issue framing, parties may employ different frames to problematize and 
justify their EU agenda. For example, some parties may be similarly Eurosceptic or 
Europhile, but they may justify their attitudes on the basis of completely different 
argumentation. Helbling et al. (2010) suggest a typology, which differentiates 
between cultural and economic frames. Cultural frames of European integration are 
identity-related. Negative cultural frames mobilise in favour of cultural homogeneity 
and the preservation of national boundaries. Positive cultural arguments suggest that 
the EU promotes multiculturalism and cultural openness. Economic frames are 
subdivided between those that refer to economic prosperity, and labour and social 
security. Positive frames refer to the EU contributing to domestic economic prosperity 
and/or labour and social security rights whereas negative frames focus on declining 
living standards, unemployment, and welfare state retrenchment. Additional frames 
include questions of security and ecology as well as arguments related to political 
efficiency and efficacy, referring to the political system. Centre-left mainstream 
parties are predicted to justify their pro-EU stance primarily on the basis of a 
multicultural-universalist rationale as well as economic prosperity arguments. 
Conservative mainstream parties are hypothesized to similarly frame their EU 
support; however prioritising economic prosperity over multicultural-universalist 
arguments. Whereas far left parties are likely to mobilise negative economic frames, 
far right parties will mostly evoke negative cultural frames.  
 
These expectations should continue to hold in times of crises. However, it is plausible 
that specific frames may intensify depending on the nature of each crisis. Crises are 
exogenous events that may change the public debate by shifting the focus of attention 
to different crisis-related pressing issues (Singer, 2013; Halikiopoulou et al., 2017). 
For example, under conditions of economic crisis, economic frames are likely to 
intensify across the party system. To the extent that the crisis is perceived as being 
caused by or resulting in external intervention, negative frames criticising the EU for 
unwarranted foreign interference are to be expected. Given their lack of both access to 
power and prior record of collaboration with the EU, these frames are more likely to 
be observed among challenger parties.  
 
Data  
 
To test these expectations, this article combines two data sources. To assess position 
and salience, it employs longitudinal data from the Chapel Hill Expert survey (Bakker 
et al., 2015). Country experts are invited to position political parties on a number of 
EU dimensions, and to evaluate EU salience in their programmatic agenda and the 
level of internal party dissent on the issue. Information is provided from four survey 
years (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014), which not only give us a snapshot of the party system 
in each of these years, but also allow us to capture potential change over time. To 
examine EU issue framing, i.e. how political parties justify their EU positions, and 
evaluate whether this may have changed as a result of the crises, the analysis relies on 
an attentive reading of Greek partiesÕ manifestos for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 
European Parliament (EP) elections. These documents have been selected as they 
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outline the partiesÕ positions on the EU. Where necessary, they have been 
supplemented by other materials in order to paint a more complete picture of EU issue 
framing in Greece. Note that data availability allow us to directly test the effect of the 
Eurozone crisis on Greek Euroscepticism, rather than the effect of other crises, such 
as the migration crisis or Brexit, which erupted after 2014. 
 
Greek Euroscepticism in times of crisis  
 
Party positions on the EU  
 
Commencing with party positions, figure 2 displays partiesÕ overall orientation 
towards European integration and the powers of the EP. The party system was 
polarised on the question of Europe in 2002, with New Democracy, PASOK and SYN 
standing firmly on the Europhile end of the spectrum, while KKE fully rejecting the 
EU project conforming to its challenger status in the system. SYN, which was 
established in the late 1980s and ran as an electoral alliance with SYRIZA from 2004 
onwards, had a left-wing vision of a social Europe in line with its Eurocommunist 
tradition. It viewed the EU as a vehicle leading the way towards socialism, democracy 
and freedom (Verney, 2011; see also Keith, 2017). In 2006, New Democracy, 
PASOK and KKE maintained their positions. We may also observe two new 
Eurosceptic parties, including the far right challenger LAOS and the leftist challenger 
DIKKI. Despite scoring similarly on the Eurosceptic axis, these parties put forward 
dissimilar objections to the EU. On the one hand, LAOS, a splinter party from New 
Democracy established in 2000, presented a sovereignty-based Eurosceptic critique 
primarily justified on ethno-cultural grounds, calling for a Europe of nations rather 
than a United States of Europe (Vasilopoulou, 2018). On the other hand, DIKKI, 
which was formed in 1995 by former PASOK members, was primarily against 
Maastricht and the EMU. Similar to PASOK in the 1980s, it argued against foreign 
interference (Verney and Michalaki, 2014). The SYN/SYRIZA electoral alliance 
moved towards a much more pronounced Eurosceptic position compared to 2002. 
This partly reflected the general anti-globalisation sentiment of the time, but also 
internal coalition dynamics as SYN had entered an alliance with various Eurosceptic 
left-wing groups (Verney, 2011).  
 
The picture was similar in 2010, but changed dramatically in 2014 when more parties 
became electorally significant. New parties populated the Europhile end of the 
spectrum, including The River, a moderate centrist political party established in 2014, 
and DIMAR, a splinter party from SYN formed in 2010. Euroscepticism also became 
more prevalent. In addition to KKE, SYRIZA and LAOS, the far right ANEL and 
Golden Dawn also articulated Eurosceptic positions. ANEL was another breakaway 
party from New Democracy, founded in 2012 after its leader, Panos Kammenos, was 
expelled from New Democracy for not toeing the party line on the second bailout 
package. Although the Golden Dawn had been established in 1983 (Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou, 2015), it experienced its electoral breakthrough during the crisis. Both 
parties were firmly anti-bailout, stressing questions of external intervention, austerity 
and national sovereignty. However, ANELÕs Euroscepticism may be considered as 
ÔsoftÕ, given that the party is willing to work within the system, whereas the Golden 
DawnÕs extreme right ideology is fundamentally incompatible with EU membership. 
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These findings support the expectation that European crises are not likely to result in 
mainstream parties altering their EU positions. PASOK and New Democracy 
maintained their pro-EU positions, despite pressures for change deriving both from 
rising public Euroscepticism and the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties. Whereas 
most challenger parties put forward Eurosceptic positions, we may nonetheless 
observe three exceptions, i.e. the Ecologist Greens, DIMAR and The River, which 
were situated on the Europhile end of the spectrum. This may be explained through 
the theory on the inverted u-pattern of party alignments on European integration, 
which suggests that parties positioned close to the centre of the left-right dimension 
tend to be favourable to integration (Hooghe et al., 2002). In addition, given that 
DIMAR supported the New Democracy-PASOK coalition government (2012-2013), 
its challenger status is debatable. The changing over time position of SYN/SYRIZA 
also confirms the expectation that the prospect of government may incentivise 
challenger parties to soften their Euroscepticism. SYRIZA scored close to the middle 
of the EU dimension in 2006, put forward a fairly hard Eurosceptic position in 2010 
at the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, and again a middle position in 2014 as the 
party became a stronger contender for power. This suggests that partiesÕ EU positions 
are not fixed, and may change depending on changing electoral and party system 
dynamics.  
 
In terms of strengthening the EPÕs powers, the picture is slightly different. Only KKE 
and the Golden Dawn strongly oppose giving more powers to the EP. The remaining 
Eurosceptic parties express different levels of support for this European institution. 
With regard to leftist Eurosceptic parties, such as SYRIZA and DIKKI, their support 
may be explained by the fact that they both advocate a Ôsocial EuropeÕ (Keith, 2017). 
They tend to view the EP as a platform for popular sovereignty that can strengthen 
accountability within the EU. A strong EP could also offset the power of other 
institutions, such as the European Commission and the European Central Bank, which 
are not only criticised for being unelected, but also for promoting neoliberal policies. 
Eurosceptic far right parties, such as LAOS and ANEL, acknowledge the fact that a 
number of important decisions take place in the EP, and view it as a forum where 
each member stateÕs MEP can defend and promote issues pertaining to the national 
interest.  
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
EU issue salience  
 
Figure 3 allows us to assess the levels of importance of the EU issue in Greek partiesÕ 
agendas as well as the extent to which there is party agreement on this question. 
Information on the figure partly confirms theoretical expectations. EU salience is 
persistently higher among the pro-EU mainstream parties compared to Eurosceptic 
issue entrepreneurs, such as SYRIZA, KKE, LAOS and Golden Dawn. This may be 
explained by both ideational and strategic reasons. First, PASOK and New 
Democracy continued to associate the question of Europe with the Westernisation and 
economic modernisation of the country. These two parties governed a small and 
peripheral EU member state where EU participation Ðat least until the crisisÐ had 
been overwhelmingly associated with policies resulting in economic prosperity and 
higher living standards. Competition had to a large extent operated on the basis of a 
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debate regarding which government had a better record of managing EU funds, and 
thus the question of Europe was salient in their respective agendas. Interestingly, as 
the crisis intensified, the two parties slightly decreased the importance they attached 
to the EU, which points towards a hesitant attempt to detach themselves from their 
previous agendas. Second, both parties suffered from very low levels of disagreement 
on the question of Europe, which suggests that they had no need to avoid the EU 
dimension in order to neutralise intra-party dissent. Both parties experienced 
moderate levels of dissent on the question of Europe in 2010, which may be attributed 
to conflicting views regarding the EUÕs involvement in the Greek crisis, but by 2014 
levels of dissent in both parties had dropped. Third, both parties Ðand especially New 
Democracy- drew support primarily from citizens with pro-EU orientations, which 
allowed them to solidify their strong pro-EU credentials and emphasise their pro-EU 
positions.  
 
 [Figure 3 about here] 
 
The EU issue is salient across the party system, and has remained so over time. While 
Eurosceptic challenger parties did not prioritise the EU as much as the pro-EU 
mainstream parties in comparative terms, the EU was still high on their agenda. 
Specifically with the eruption of the crisis in 2009, all Greek Europsceptic parties 
increased their emphasis on the EU. EU issue salience across the party system slightly 
decreased in 2014, which suggests that parties prioritised domestic issues that needed 
immediate resolution, such as the economy, the stateÕs finances, and questions of 
governance. The most interesting finding that relates to challenger partiesÕ dissent 
over European integration concerns SYRIZA. This was by far the most divided party 
on the question of Europe, which goes some way to explaining the publicÕs confusion 
over whether the party did or did not advocate in favour of GreeceÕs withdrawal from 
the Eurozone.  
 
EU issue framing  
 
Starting from the mainstream pro-EU New Democracy and PASOK, we may observe 
the employment of a variety of positive frames. Both parties justified their pro-EU 
attitudes in terms of meeting the countryÕs economic interests through EU 
participation. New Democracy prioritised questions of prosperity and quality of life 
over labour rights. The partyÕs main objective was to ensure that Greek citizens have 
the same standard of living compared to their European counterparts (New 
Democracy, 2004: 24). This was defined with reference to salaries, quality of life, and 
public services. On the other hand, PASOK (2004; 2009) focused much more on 
questions of social rights and social cohesion. It viewed GreeceÕs EU membership as 
way of addressing inequalities and ensuring equal opportunities. Both parties 
perceived the EU as providing external security and regional stability. They supported 
TurkeyÕs accession as a means of resolving the Cyprus dispute, but also issues related 
to GreeceÕs borders. PASOKÕs pro-EU framing was composed by additional 
arguments of political efficacy and efficiency, particularly regarding the partyÕs 
contribution as part of the European SocialistsÕ agenda towards the democratisation of 
the EU; as well as environmental protection. The multiculturalism argument was not 
prominent in either partyÕs pro-EU argumentation.  
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The crisis was portrayed differently, however. New Democracy (2009: 4) focused on 
limiting the effects of the economic crisis through continued EU participation, and 
portrayed the EU as supporting the Greek economy (New Democracy, 2012). PASOK 
(2009) touched upon the argument that the EUÕs neo-liberal policies contributed to 
the crisis, and that the EU should recognise Greek efforts at addressing the crisis 
(PASOK, 2009; 2014). PASOK (2014) put forward a vision of a free, secure and just 
Europe that ensures the social cohesion, equal development and solidarity among its 
members. The party warned against populism and austerity, calling for a system that 
would allow Greece to regain its credibility. Both parties employed the crisis to 
criticize each other. New democracy (2009) insisted that it was the only Greek party 
with a ÔtrueÕ European orientation. PASOK (2009) directly blamed New Democracy 
for the mismanagement of EU funds, which -the party argued- contributed to the 
countryÕs lack of credibility abroad and its economic crisis.  
 
In terms of Eurosceptic frames, we may also observe the predominance of the 
economic category across challenger parties. Additional frames included security and 
foreign interference mostly mobilised by far left Eurosceptic actors, and 
cultural/nationalistic frames primarily employed by far right Eurosceptic parties. 
Specifically, starting from the far left, KKE (2004; 2009) endorsed ÔresistanceÕ, 
ÔdisobedienceÕ and ÔinsubordinationÕ, arguing that EU policies were Ôanti-popularÕ 
and urging Greek voters to embark upon a struggle against the EU cul-de-sac 
(Ευρωµονόδροµος) (KKE, 2004; 2009; 2014). KKE used economic frames both 
related to economic prosperity and labour/social security to argue that EU 
membership is a capitalist alliance that serves the interests of the rich and powerful, 
including bankers, industrialists and ship-owners, at the expense of the working class 
that has lost its social and labour rights. In addition, the party justified its 
Euroscepticism with reference to negative security arguments, specifically framed in 
terms of foreign interference. It portrayed the EU as an imperialistic power, which 
along with the US and NATO, intervenes in countriesÕ domestic affairs, promotes 
war, and seeks to establish protectorate states. Contrary to expectations, KKE put 
forward nationalist frames, but instead of focusing on culture, it prioritised popular 
sovereignty and self-sufficiency (e.g. see Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). The crisis did 
not fundamentally change the partyÕs anti-EU framing. Economic frames did, 
however, predominate, as the crisis further consolidated existing argumentation that 
the EU is a neo-liberal project that does not serve the peoples of Europe. KKE (2014) 
continued to call for GreeceÕs withdrawal from the EU and the unilateral suspension 
of the countryÕs debt payments.  
 
Similar to KKE, the far left SYRIZA (SYN, 2004; SYRIZA, 2009; 2014) framed its 
Euroscepticism primarily with reference to economic and security frames. The EU 
was viewed as a ÔGreat allianceÕ between right-wing and left-wing neoliberal forces, 
whose anti-democratic policies negatively impact upon social cohesion, economic 
prosperity, womenÕs rights and minority protection. SYRIZA opposed all European 
Treaties since Maastricht. The party (2009) stood firmly against the militarisation of 
Europe and the EUÕs foreign interference, which it viewed as undermining peace, 
stability and cooperation in Europe. However, unlike KKE, SYRIZA also employed 
negative frames of political efficacy and efficiency in its anti-EU reasoning, 
especially the criticism that the EU is unaccountable and undemocratic not taking 
EuropeansÕ views into consideration. Most importantly, it did not Ðopenly in its 
European manifestosÐ advocate GreeceÕs unilateral withdrawal from the EU and the 
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Eurozone. The party did not advocate a Ônational road to socialismÕ. Instead, at the 
height of the crisis, it put forward a Ôradical criticismÕ of the EU, and offered its 
alternative vision of a socialist Europe defined as Ôa Europe of employment, rights, 
solidarity, democracy, peace, progressive development, gender equality, without 
racism or homophobia; a Europe that guarantees equality among its peoplesÕ 
(SYRIZA, 2014: 2). In 2014, the EUÕs foreign interference was also framed in 
economic terms, for example with reference to GermanyÕs intervention in EU 
member statesÕ domestic affairs.  
 
The far right LAOS, ANEL and the Golden Dawn combined economic and 
cultural/nationalism frames.
3
 They often merged cultural and security anti-EU frames. 
LAOS (2004) was critical of the Euro, which was seen as resulting in economic 
decline. The party argued that the EU discarded EuropeansÕ Christian values and 
culture. It criticised the EU for failing to protect Greek and Greek Cypriot security 
vis--vis Turkey (LAOS, 2004) as well as Greek parties for not fighting for the Greek 
national interest in the EU, specifically referring to Cyprus and Turkey (LAOS, 
2009). LAOS portrayed itself as the only party advocating the interests of Greece and 
ÔHellenismÕ in the EU. ANEL (2014) argued that EU membership had resulted in the 
country loosing sovereignty in all policy domains. It also called for a coalition 
between countries of Southern Europe in order to ÔfightÕ against Northern European 
states. Finally the party reiterated that Greek borders are also EU borders. This 
security frame was linked both to GreeceÕs relations with neighbouring countries as 
well as migration. Lastly, the Golden Dawn viewed the EU as a Ôtotal failureÕ with 
devastating consequences on Greek industrial and agricultural production. The party 
called for self-sufficiency, national production, and a return to the national currency. 
The EU was framed as inspired by Marxist ideals, which Ôdestroy national identityÕ 
and Ôobliterate national consciousnessÕ (Linardis, 2015).  
 
Discussion  
 
The multiple crises facing the EU Ðthe economic crisis in particularÐ contributed to a 
Eurosceptic shift in Greek public opinion; new parties populating the Europhile end 
of the spectrum; the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties; and a coalition 
government united not by ideological affinity but by a common Eurosceptic and anti-
austerity agenda. These changes increased the relevance of Eurosceptic voices in the 
system. That being said, we must be careful not to equate support for these parties as 
exclusively linked to their Euroscepticism. Their success was also partly related to the 
fact that Ðunlike the two pro-EU mainstream partiesÐ they were not associated with or 
deemed responsible for the crisis. Therefore their protest and anti-system character 
also heavily contributed to their success. The rise of Eurosceptic parties did not 
coincide with a ÔEurosceptic contagionÕ across the party system. Instead, we may 
observe a stronger polarisation on the EU dimension with parties presenting a variety 
of different options to the electorate on the question of Europe.  
 
Two findings are particularly interesting. First, New Democracy, which is the main 
right-wing actor in the system, continued to adhere to its pro-EU agenda. Second, 
SYRIZA, which effectively replaced PASOK as the main left-wing contender for 
power, progressively softened its Euroscepticism. In essence, both parties decided that 
it is best to address the crisis within rather than outside the EU. For New Democracy, 
this may be understood through a focus on the centrality of Westernisation and 
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Europeanisation in its ideology. The party was also aware of the countryÕs limited 
state capacity outside the EU. The progressive softening of SYRIZAÕs Euroscepticism 
may be explained through the realities of governance. When the party entered 
government, it became clear that Greece was not in a strong negotiating position vis-
-vis the troika, and could not therefore obtain the concessions it had hoped for. This 
U-turn, however, did not prevent the party from winning the September 2015 national 
election. This suggests that although SYRIZAÕs Eurosceptic agenda contributed to its 
rise, it was not necessarily responsible for its continued electoral success. SYRIZA 
represented a new political force in the system, not previously tainted by corruption, 
nepotism and rent-seeking behaviour, which ultimately consolidated its presence in 
the party system.  
 
The article has offered an analysis of the changes that occurred in Greek politics 
following the eruption of the global financial crisis. Since then, the EU has had to also 
address a migration and a constitutional crisis. It is hard to assess the relative weight 
of the above crises on the party politics of Euroscepticism in Greece, as the latter two 
are continuing to unfold as of the time of writing. The key observation thus far is that 
the economic crisis has had a greater effect on Greek politics, as it was tightly 
intertwined with significant domestic economic problems and the chronic persistence 
of clientelism.   
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Notes  
1
 This is because research has shown that Greece is a populist democracy based on 
pluralistic values, which are nonetheless inimical to political liberalism (Pappas, 
2013). Despite the fact that GreeceÕs transition in the late 1970s commenced with 
New Democracy initiating liberal reforms, this trend was quickly reversed with 
PASOK assuming office from the 1980s onwards. PASOK was a highly personalised 
and populist party, which offered a master narrative separating the Greek ÔpeopleÕ 
from an exploiting domestic and foreign ÔestablishmentÕ. PASOKÕs political success 
not only consolidated this political cleavage in the Greek society, but also resulted in 
New Democracy strategically co-opting this populist strategy in order to compete 
with PASOK in the context of the Greek two-party system. Various efforts to 
modernise and reform the political system in the 1990s and 2000s failed. New 
Democracy and PASOK employed their access to state resources in order to distribute 
rents for party political purposes. Populism remained a key feature of the entire party 
system during the crisis Ðalbeit in different forms depending on mainstream versus 
challenger party dynamics (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). The establishment of the 
coalition government between SYRIZA and the Independent Greeks (ANEL) in 2015 
further solidified the populist character of Greek politics, as these two parties were 
divided by their ideology, but were nonetheless united by their populist anti-
establishment credentials, which allowed them to coalesce (Aslanidis and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2016). 
2
 http://www.presidency.gr/?page_id=4144, accessed on 1 September 2017. 
3
 Note that while ANEL issued a manifesto for the 2014 EP election, but not for 
previous years; LAOS issued a manifesto for the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. There 
is no available Golden Dawn manifesto for the 2014 election. 
 
References 
 
Adams J, Clark M, Ezrow L and Glasgow G (2006) Are niche parties fundamentally 
different from mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of 
Western European partiesÕ policy shifts, 1976Ð1998. American Journal of Political 
Science 50(3): 513Ð529. 
 
ANEL (2014) Κυβερνητικό πρόγραµµα Ανεξάρτητων Ελλήνων Ενότητα ΒÕ τοµέας 
εξωτερικών. Athens: ANEL.   
 
Aslanidis P and Rovira Kaltwasser C (2016) Dealing with populists in government: 
the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece. Democratization 23(6): 1077-1091. 
 
Bakker R, Edwards E, Hooghe L, Jolly S, Koedam J, Kostelka F, Marks G, Polk J, 
Rovny J, Schumacher G, Steenbergen M, Vachudova M and Zilovic M (2015) 1999 − 
2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File. Version 1.13 Available on chesdata.eu. 
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
 
Budge I (2015) Issue Emphases, Saliency Theory and Issue Ownership: A Historical 
and Conceptual Analysis. West European Politics 38(4): 761-777. 
 
Clements B, Nanou, N and Verney, S (2014) ÔWe No Longer Love You, But We 
DonÕt Want To Leave YouÕ: The Eurozone Crisis and Popular Euroscepticism in 
Greece. Journal of European Integration 36(3): 247-265. 
	 15 
 
Clogg R (1987) Parties and elections in Greece: The search for legitimacy. North 
Carolina: Duke University Press.  
 
De Vries C and Hobolt S (2012) When dimensions collide: The electoral success of 
issue entrepreneurs. European Union Politics 13(2) 246Ð268. 
 
Dinas E and Rori L (2013) The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear and 
Loathing in the Polls. West European Politics 36(1): 270-282. 
 
Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper. 
 
Entman RM (1993) Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of 
Communication 43(4): 51Ð58. 
 
Eurobarometer (2015) Public opinion in the European Union, Eurobarometer 84 
Autumn, European Commission.  
 
Featherstone K (1994) Political Parties. In: Kazakos P and Ioakimidis P (eds) Greece 
and EC Membership Evaluated. London: Pinter pp. 140-154. 
 
Guild E, Costello C, Garlick M and Moreno-Lax V (2015) The 2015 Refugee Crisis 
in the European Union. Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 332, 
September. Available at 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20PB332%20Refugee%20Crisis%20in%20
EU_0.pdf  
 
Halikiopoulou D, Nanou, K and Vasilopoulou S (2012) The paradox of nationalism: 
The common denominator of radical right and radical left Euroscepticism. European 
Journal of Political Research 51(4): 504-539. 
 
Halikiopoulou D, Nanou, K and Vasilopoulou S (2017) Nationalist issue framing: 
Party competition and the far right in times of economic crisis. Paper presented at the 
10
th
 Anniversary Conference of the Comparative Agendas Project, 15-17 June, 
University of Edinburgh.  
 
Helbling M, Hoeglinger D, and West B (2010) How Political Parties Frame 
European Integration. European Journal of Political Research 49(4): 496-521. 
 
Hooghe L, Marks G and Wilson C (2002) Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions 
on European Integration? Comparative Political Studies 35(8): 965-989. 
 
Kalyvas S (1997) Polarisation in Greek politics: PASOKÕs first four years, 1981-
1985. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 23(1): 83-104. 
 
Karamouzi E (2015) A strategy for Greece: Democratisation and European 
Integration, 1974-1975. Cahiers de la Mditerrane, 90: 11-25. 
 
Katsanidou A and Otjes S (2016) How the European debt crisis reshaped national 
political space: The case of Greece. European Union Politics 17(2): 242Ð261. 
	 16 
 
Keith D (2017) Opposing Europe, Opposing Austerity: Radical left parties and the 
Eurosceptic debate. In: Leruth B, Startin, N and Usherwood, S (eds) The Routledge 
Handbook of Euroscepticism. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
KKE (2004) Διακηρυξη της Κεντρικης Επιτροπης του ΚΚΕ για τις ευρωεκλογές της 
13ης Ιούνη 2004. Athens: KKE.  
 
KKE (2009) Διακήρυξη της Κεντρικής Επιτροπής του ΚΚΕ για τις Ευρωεκλογές του 
Ιουνη 2009. Athens: KKE. 
 
KKE (2014) Διακήρυξη της Κεντρικής Επιτροπής του ΚΚΕ για τις Ευρωεκλογές του 
Μάη 2014. Athens: KKE. 
 
Kokkinaki F (1998) Attitudes towards European Monetary Union in Greece: 
Antecedents, strength and consequences. Journal of Economic Psychology 19(6): 
775-796. 
 
LAOS (2004) Ευρωεκλογές 2004 Ο ΛΑ.Ο.Σ δυνατός δυνατή Ελλάδα. Athens: LAOS.  
 
LAOS (2009) Ευρωεκλογές 2009 ΛΑ.Ο.Σ η δυνατή φωνή στην Ευρώπη. Athens: 
LAOS. 
 
Linardis G (2015) Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ως εργαλείο εξόντωσης της εθνικής 
συνείδησης, 22 March available at: http://www.xryshaygh.com/enimerosi/view/h-
eurwpaikh-enwsh-ws-ergaleio-ejontwshs-ths-ethnikhs-suneidhshs  
 
Mudde C (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39(4): 542-563. 
 
New Democracy (2004) Ευρωεκλογές 2004 Πολιτικά Κείµενα,  Γραµµατεία Πολιτικου 
Σχεδιασµού Και Προγράµµατος. Athens: New Democracy.  
 
New Democracy (2009) Νέα Δηµοκρατία: Ευρωπαϊκή επιλογή µε σύµµαχο εσένα. 
Athens: New Democracy. 
 
New Democracy (2012) National election manifesto 2012. Athens: New Democracy 	
 
Pagoulatos G (2004) Believing in national exceptionalism: ideas and economic 
divergence in Southern Europe. West European Politics 27(1): 45-70. 
 
Pagoulatos G and Triantopoulos C (2009) The Return of the Greek Patient: Greece 
and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. South European Society and Politics 14(1): 35-
54. 
 
Pappas T (2013) Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-
Communist Hungary. Government and Opposition 49(1):1-23. 
 
PASOK (1977) Οµιλία του προέδρου του ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ Ανδρέα Γ. Παπανδρέου στην 
Αθήνα στις 16 Νοέµβρη 1977. Athens: PASOK.   
 
	 17 
PASOK (1984) Η Δεκαπεντάλεπτη οµιλία του Πρωθυπουργού κ. Ανδρέα Γ. 
Παπανδρέου για τις Ευρωεκλογές στο τηλεοπτικό κανάλι της ΕΡΤ1 στις 20:45. 13 June. 
Athens: PASOK.  
 
PASOK (2004) Ευρωεκλογές 2004. Το όραµα, οι θέσεις, οι δεσµεύσεις µας. Athens: 
PASOK. 
 
PASOK (2009) Το ÔΟραµα, οι στόχοι και οι δεσµεύσεις µας. Athens: PASOK. 	
 
PASOK (2014) Πολιτική διακήρυξη ΕλιάÐΔηµοκρατική Παράταξη. Athens: 
PASOK/ELIA. 
 
Rori L (2016) The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: from great expectations to no 
expectations. West European Politics 39(6): 1323-1343.  
Singer MM (2013) The global economic crisis and domestic political agendas. 
Electoral Studies 32(3): 404-410. 
Sitter N (2001) The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: Is 
Euro-scepticism a Government - Opposition dynamic? West European Politics 24(4): 
22-39. 
 
SYN (2004) Διακήρυξη για τις Ευρωεκλογές της 13ης Ιουνίου 2004. Athens: SYN. 
 
SYRIZA (2009) Διακήρυξη Συνασπισµού Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς για τις 
Ευρωεκλογές. Athens: SYRIZA. 
 
SYRIZA (2014) Διακήρυξη για τις Ευρωεκλογές 2014. Athens: SYRIZA.  
 
Taggart P (1998) A Touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western 
European party systems. European Journal of Political Research 33(3): 363-388. 
 
Tsatsanis E and Teperoglou E (2016) Realignment under Stress: The July 2015 
Referendum and the September Parliamentary Election in Greece. South European 
Society and Politics 21(4): 427-450.  
 
Van de Wardt M, De Vries C and Hobolt S (2014) Exploiting the Cracks: Wedge 
Issues in Multiparty Competition. The Journal of Politics 76(4): 986Ð999. 
Vasilopoulou S (2018) Far Right Parties and Euroscepticism: Patterns of Opposition. 
LondonL Rowman & Litlefield International in partnership with ECPR Press. 
 
Vasilopoulou S and Halikiopoulou D (2015) The Golden DawnÕs Ônationalist 
solutionÕ: Explaining the rise of the far right in Greece. Palgrave Pivot. 
 
Vasilopoulou S and Halikiopoulou D (2013) In the Shadow of Grexit: the Greek 
Election of 11 June 2012. South European Society and Politics 18(4), 523-542. 
 
	 18 
Vasilopoulou S, Halikiopoulou D, and Exadaktylos T (2014) Greece in crisis: 
austerity, populism and the politics of blame. Journal Of Common Market Studies 
52(2): 388-402. 
 
Verney S (2011) An Exceptional Case? Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 
1959Ð2009. South European Society and Politics 16(01): 51-79. 
 
Verney S (2015) Waking the Ôsleeping giantÕ or expressing domestic dissent? 
Mainstreaming Euroscepticism in crisis-stricken Greece. International Political 
Science Review 36(3): 279Ð295.  
 
Verney S and Michalaki S (2014) Greece. In: Conti N (ed) Party attitudes towards the 
EU in the member states: Parties for Europe, parties against Europe. Oxon: 
Routledge.  
 
Wagner M (2012) When do parties emphasise extreme positions? How strategic 
incentives for policy differentiation influence issue importance. European Journal of 
Political Research 51(1): 64Ð88.  
 
Whitefield S and Rohrschneider R (2015) The Salience of European Integration to 
Party Competition: Western and Eastern Europe Compared. East European Politics 
and Societies and Cultures 29(1): 12Ð39.  
	 19 
Figure 1 Greek and EU-wide negative image of the European Union, 2002 Ð 2017  
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer, European Commission. (ÔIn general, does the European 
Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or 
very negative image?Õ). 
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Figure 2 Party positions on the EU and on the powers of the EP   
 
 
Source: Bakker et al., 2015. 
Note: EU position: overall orientation of party leadership in each survey year 
(1=strongly opposed; 7 strongly=in favour). EP powers: position of the party 
leadership on the powers of the European Parliament (1=strong opposition; 7=strong 
support).  
Party acronyms: PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK); New Democracy (ND); 
Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN); Greek Communist Party (KKE); Coalition of 
the Radical Left (SYRIZA); Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI); Popular 
Orthodox Rally (LAOS); Ecologist Greens (OP); The River (Potami); Democratic 
Left (DIMAR); Independent Greeks (ANEL).  
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Figure 3 EU issue salience and EU issue dissent  
 
 
Source: Bakker et al., 2015. 
Note: EU salience: relative salience of European integration in the partyÕs public 
stance (0 = European Integration is of no importance, never mentioned;  10 = 
European Integration is the most important issue). EU dissent: degree of party dissent 
on European integration (0 = Party was completely united;  10 = Party was extremely 
divided). 
 
 
 
 
 
